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IntroductIon
 Consider this scenario: on the same day, two sixteen-year-olds are 
apprehended after shoplifting DVDs from the same local superstore. One child’s 
case is processed by the juvenile court, and he or she receives an extremely lenient 
disposition consisting of a verbal warning from the judge accompanied by no mark 
on his or her criminal record. However, the other child’s case is transferred to 
the adult criminal court system. This child faces the possibility of much harsher 
punishment and an additional mark on his or her criminal record that will hinder 
his or her ability to successfully apply to school programs and jobs. How can such 
disparate treatment occur? The second youth had been previously transferred to 
adult court for a minor charge two years prior, at the whim of a prosecutor who 
chose to directly file the case in adult court. In light of the widely enacted “once an 
adult, always an adult” doctrine that requires transfer of all previously transferred 
juveniles to adult court for subsequent crimes, a scenario similar to the one described 
above can occur in over half of the states, regardless of the severity of the crime.1
1.     G. Larry Mays & rIck ruddeLL, do the crIMe, do the tIMe: JuvenILe crIMInaLs and 
aduLt JustIce In the aMerIcan court systeM 10 (2012).
* Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. expected 2015; University of Kentucky, 
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 This Note argues that the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine does 
more harm than good for a myriad of reasons. In particular, the doctrine is at 
odds with the biological and social realities of youth, results in many transfers of 
nonviolent offenders, and exposes youth to disproportionate harm in adult jails. 
This doctrine is not a suitable way to adequately and fairly address the problem of 
juvenile crime when viewed in light of developmental understandings and studies 
concerning recidivism prevention, and reforms in this area are sorely needed.  
 Part I of this Note discusses the history and background of the juvenile 
justice system, transfers of youth to adult court, and the role of the “once an adult, 
always an adult” doctrine in the process. In Part II of this Note, social science 
understandings illuminate why youth are more susceptible to risk-taking and 
criminal behavior, and thus why the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine 
impacts a great number of children. Legal responses are analyzed in Part III of this 
Note, which discusses how the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine works, 
along with legal reasoning behind enactment of the doctrine. Part IV analyzes 
the negative effects of the doctrine, including unduly harsh punishments and the 
doctrine’s disparate impact on minorities and youth who are housed with adult 
inmates in jails. Part V discusses reform proposals that would better correspond 
with the realities of youth and that would likely lower the recidivism rate. This 
Note concludes that legal reforms are necessary because the “once an adult, always 
an adult” doctrine does little to curb the juvenile crime rate, while simultaneously 
negatively impacting the lives of a significant number of children.
  
I. the JuvenILe JustIce systeM and transfers to aduLt courts
A. Development and Nature of the Juvenile Justice System 
 The concept of a separate court system for juvenile offenders has long 
been a staple of the American legal system.2 The industrial revolution, an influx of 
immigrants in the late 1800s, and the Progressive Movement’s emphasis on “child 
saving” resulted in an environment that sought to diminish the legal system’s harsh 
treatment of juveniles.3 The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899.4 
The idea of a separate juvenile court system flourished, and all states had established 
separate juvenile court systems by the 1940s.5 The differences between the juvenile 
justice system and traditional court system were vast—the juvenile court system 
abandoned the formal and adversarial nature of the traditional system and instead 
based operations on the concepts of informality and individual assessment, in 
2.     Id. at 30–31.
3.     Id. at 31–32.
4.     Id. at 24.
5.     C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive 
Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 u. kan. L. rev. 659, 667 (2005).
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order to work towards the goal of rehabilitating young delinquents into productive 
members of society.6 Judges assumed more discretionary roles when determining 
what punishments or resources children needed to be rehabilitated, and juvenile 
hearings were confidential and closed to the public.7
 Despite the benevolent goals of the juvenile justice system, the informal 
and individualized approach did not mesh well with the sheer amount of juveniles 
flowing into the system in the 1960s.8 Because the juvenile court systems were 
overwhelmed and in-depth individual assessments were no longer feasible, juveniles 
were perfunctorily reprimanded by a judge or sent to an institution.9 As punishments 
for juveniles became more similar to punishments for adult criminals, the U.S. 
Supreme Court was confronted with the glaring lack of due process safeguards 
accorded to youth in juvenile justice proceedings.10 In response, the Court awarded 
juveniles many of the same due process rights inherent in the traditional court 
system.11 As a result of seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases, juveniles now enjoy the 
right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the right to be notified of charges, and the right to have 
the charges against them proven beyond a reasonable doubt.12
 The introduction of these procedural safeguards into the juvenile justice 
system wrought much change. Presence of counsel and heightened proof 
requirements, in particular, fostered a more adversarial atmosphere.13 There was also 
an increased focus on the elements of the crime charged, rather than the particular 
nature of the offender.14 Over time, a system established upon the concepts of 
informality, individual assessment, and rehabilitation, has in some ways evolved 
into a parallel system to the traditional adult courts.15 As a result, many juvenile 
courts are meting out harsher and more punitive sanctions to juvenile lawbreakers, 
especially children charged with serious or violent crimes.16 However, juvenile 
justice punishments are still generally less harsh than the sentences young men and 
women would receive if prosecuted in adult courtrooms.17 Especially for juveniles 
charged with minor offenses, punishment in the juvenile justice system often 
consists of community-based treatment programs, rather than incarceration.18
6.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 32–33.
7.     Id.
8.     Clarke, supra note 5, at 669.
9.     Id.
10.     Id. at 670–73.
11.     See id. at 669–70.
12.     In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13.     Clarke, supra note 5, at 672–73.
14.     Id. at 672.
15.     See id. at 672–73.
16.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 46–47.
17.     Id.
18.     Id.
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B. The Practice of Transferring Juveniles to Adult Courts
 Despite the more formal and adversarial nature that has developed in juvenile 
courtrooms, the juvenile justice system still takes into account the lower maturity 
level of juvenile offenders. Young women and men sentenced in juvenile courts 
tend to receive less punitive punishments than they would if they were to have 
been prosecuted in adult court.19 Although individuals under the age of eighteen 
cannot be sentenced to death,20 juveniles appearing in adult court can receive severe 
and lengthy punishments, including a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.21 Additionally, juvenile jurisdiction ends at a specified age, 
typically twenty-one, and youth incarcerated in juvenile detention centers are 
released upon reaching that age, while juveniles sentenced in adult court are not.22 
Conviction in adult court can also result in a permanent criminal record that may 
stigmatize and dampen possibilities for advancement for juveniles down the road, 
such as admission to schools or job offers.23  
 The practice of transferring juveniles to adult court was championed by the 
media and policy makers as a result of increasing juvenile crime rates between the 
1960s and 1990s, along with sensationalized crimes committed by juveniles, such as 
the Columbine school shooting tragedy.24 After a tragic school shooting in Red Lion, 
Pennsylvania, a barrage of sensationalized newspaper articles were immediately 
penned about the incident.25 This excessive coverage resulted in public fear and 
panic, and pressed Pennsylvanians to support legislation that made it even easier to 
prosecute juveniles in traditional adult courts.26 In order to implement severe penalties 
against violent juvenile criminals or repeat offenders, almost every state has enacted 
laws enabling juveniles to easily be transferred to adult court jurisdiction.27 
Currently, forty-four states and the District of Columbia allow for juveniles 
to be transferred to adult courts via judicial or discretionary waiver.28 Although the 
juvenile crime rate has been decreasing since 1994, public perception regarding 
19.     Id. at 46, 160–61.
20.     Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
21.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 2.
22.     Id. at 159.
23.     See id. at 160–61; Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 
2005 WIs. L. rev. 617, 620–21 (2005) (discussing the negative impact of a criminal record 
upon individuals seeking employment, a residence, or wishing to purchase items with credit).
24.     Clarke, supra note 5, at 674–76.
25.     Anthony R. Holtzman, Comment, Juvenile Justice? The Increased Propensity for 
Juvenile Transfer to the Criminal Court System in Pennsylvania and the Need for a Revised 
Approach to Juvenile Offenders, 109 Penn st. L. rev. 657–58 (2004).
26.     Id. at 657–59.
27.     Clarke, supra note 5, at 677 (“Between 1992 and 1997, legislatures in forty-four states 
and the District of Columbia enacted provisions to facilitate the transfer of juvenile offenders 
to the criminal courts.”).
28.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 82−86 & tbl.4.1.
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juvenile crime remains pessimistic, and a large majority of the public supports the 
practice of transferring youth to adult courts.29 Although transfers to adult courts 
are relatively rare,30 the practice remains quite concerning because many youth face 
the possibility of transfer and the implications when juveniles are prosecuted in 
adult court can be extremely detrimental and long lasting.31
 There are multiple mechanisms that can transfer juveniles to adult court. 
Judicial waiver statutes allow judges to decide whether a juvenile will appear in the 
juvenile or adult court system.32 In some states, prosecutors can simply file juvenile 
cases directly in adult court.33 Unlike the judicial waiver practice, a juvenile whose 
case is filed directly in adult court by a prosecutor does not possess the right to a 
transfer hearing before a judge.34 Although most states with direct file provisions 
allow juveniles transferred via prosecutorial discretion to argue before a judge 
for a “reverse waiver” back to juvenile court, four jurisdictions with direct file 
provisions do not allow this.35 Additionally, some states exclude specific offenses—
often serious or violent crimes—from juvenile court jurisdiction and, therefore, 
juveniles charged with such crimes automatically appear in adult court.36 Juveniles 
can also be transferred via blended sentencing laws. A blended sentencing law is a 
model that imposes traditional adult sanctions on the convicted juvenile only if and 
when he or she does not meet certain conditions imposed by the juvenile court.37 
Additionally, some states set the upper age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction lower 
than eighteen years of age. In these jurisdictions, children sixteen or seventeen years 
of age automatically appear in adult court.38 Lastly, the “once an adult, always an 
adult” doctrine automatically considers previously transferred juveniles as adults 
for all subsequent crimes they are charged with, regardless of severity.39  
 
29.     Id. at 146−47 & tbl.6.2 (explaining that 72.8% of respondents, out of fourteen studies, 
supported transfers of juveniles to adult courts).
30.     Id. at 59 (indicating that in a 2008 study, of 1.653 million referrals to juvenile court, 
8,898 (or 0.5% of all cases) resulted in transfers to adult court).
31.     See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 
crIMe & Just. 81, 114 (2000).
32.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 8.
33.     Id. at 8–9.
34.     Id. at 9.
35.     Id. at 87 (explaining that Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Washington D.C. do not 
allow juveniles to argue for “reverse waiver” in front of a judge).
36.     Id.
37.     Id. at 10.
38.     Id. Mays & Ruddell point out that two states set the upper age limit of juvenile court ju-
risdiction at age sixteen, and thus all individuals aged sixteen and older appear in adult courts. 
Ten states provide for individuals aged seventeen and older to automatically appear in adult 
courts. The juvenile court systems in the remaining states have adopted the traditional upper 
age limit of eighteen. Id.
39.     Id.
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II. Why do JuvenILes Break the LaW?
 Although the juvenile crime rate peaked in the mid-1990s and has remained 
stable or in decline ever since,40 there is no denying that juvenile crime is a 
problem. According to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
there were 4,367 arrests for every 100,000 youth aged ten through seventeen in 
2011.41 That statistic does not even encompass the vast amount of juvenile criminal 
activity that does not result in an arrest or formal charge.42 Studies have shown that, 
categorically, juveniles are more likely to engage in risky decision making during 
this stage of life than they will after they become adults.43 Kathleen Kemp’s analysis 
of “developmental immaturity”44 and Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg’s 
research regarding immature judgment in adolescents45 are prime examples of 
current studies that discuss the elevated risk-taking propensity of juveniles.
 Many young women and men end up in the court system because they 
are biologically more vulnerable during this developmental stage than similarly 
situated adults.46 The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted as fact that juveniles 
possess lower levels of maturity and responsibility, and are thus acutely susceptible 
to negative influences.47 Laurence Steinberg, in his social science assessment of the 
relation between brain development and behavior in adolescence, discusses studies 
40.     Statistical Briefing Book, offIce of JuvenILe JustIce & deLInquency Preven-
tIon (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 
[hereinafter Statistical Briefing Book]. Similarly, the crime rate in the general popula-
tion has decreased over time as well. Table 1: Crime in the United States (1993−2012), 
fBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/
tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volume_and_rate_
per_100000_inhabitants_1993-2012.xls (Jan. 30, 2015).
41.     Statistical Briefing Book, supra note 40.
42.     See id.
43.     Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development Trends in Adolescence, 9 
trends coGnItIve scI. 69, 71 (2005).
44.     Kathleen Kemp & Naomi Goldstein, Characteristics of Developmental Immaturity: 
A Cross-Disciplinary Survey of Psychologists (Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Drexel University), https://idea.library.drexel.edu/islandora/object/idea%3A3490/datastream/
OBJ/download/Characteristics_of_developmental_immaturity__a_cross-disciplinary_sur-
vey_of_psychologists (outlining research findings that juveniles are cognitively different from 
adults, and have heightened risk-taking behaviors that tend to decrease as they enter adult-
hood).
45.     Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: 
Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 Behav. scI. & L. 741 (2000). 
Cauffman & Steinberg studied maturity of judgment in over 1,000 participants, ranging in age 
from twelve to forty-eight. The studies concluded that “socially responsible decision making” 
was more common among older participants, and maturity of judgment seems to stabilize 
after the adolescent stage is completed. Id. at 756.
46.     See Clarke, supra note 5, at 687.
47.     Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
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comparing juvenile decision making in hypothetical moral dilemmas to decision 
making in “real life” dilemmas.48 These studies indicate that adolescents are able to 
make rational and logical decisions when confronted with hypothetical dilemmas, 
but not when confronted with dilemmas in their actual lives.49 Although when 
analyzed in a vacuum, a youth may be able to reason as logically and rationally as 
an adult, risk-taking behavior of youth is likely influenced by “hot cognitions,” or 
decision making based on emotion and passion, that is a hallmark of this volatile 
developmental period.50
 Steinberg’s analysis discusses both cognitive and affective, or emotional, 
developments and explains how affective developments occur at a much slower 
rate than cognitive developments.51 This developmental mismatch helps to 
establish why youth are able to rationally assess hypothetical problems, yet still 
tend to participate in impulsive and dangerous activities.52 Juveniles experience a 
“maturity gap” and do not yet possess the full biological capacity to understand or 
control attraction to risky or irresponsible behaviors.53 Legal line drawing, such as 
a minimum age requirement to drink alcohol or operate a vehicle, is an example 
of lawmakers bearing in mind the impulsivity of juveniles and attempting to 
protect youth from their own risky behaviors.54 Studies have indicated that socially 
responsible decision making tends to stabilize at around the age of nineteen, after a 
gradual development occurring around ages sixteen to nineteen.55 
 Peer pressure and social surroundings also play a large role in the propensity 
of juveniles to engage in criminal behavior. During adolescent development and 
exploration, many young men and women look to peers they encounter at school or 
in their neighborhood for guidance and acceptance.56 Adolescents often engage in 
risky behavior to fit in with classmates or neighborhood peers who are participating 
in antisocial behavior.57 The problem of risk taking to gain acceptance or approval 
is exacerbated for juveniles because, unlike adults, adolescents are often powerless 
to leave their school or parents’ home, and are thus essentially stuck in the same 
social setting.58 Peer pressure and inability to escape social settings, along with the 
48.     Steinberg, supra note 43, at 71–73.
49.     Id. at 71−72.
50.     See id. at 72−73.
51.     Id. (explaining how affective developments are more closely associated with pubertal 
maturity, while cognitive development is more closely associated with age).
52.     Id. at 71.
53.     See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Jus-
tice, 85 notre daMe L. rev. 89, 110−11 (2009).
54.     See Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins 
for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 hofstra L. rev. 463, 480 (2003).
55.     Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 756.
56.     Clarke, supra note 5, at 707−08.
57.     See id. at 705 
58.     Id. at 708.
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aforementioned biological factors,59 help explain why young individuals commit 
crimes, often more than once, and are thus subject to the possibility of transfer to 
adult court.
   
III. LeGaL resPonse: the “once an aduLt, aLWays an aduLt” doctrIne
 The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine is one mechanism that can 
work to transfer juveniles to adult court. Although there are slight variations among 
jurisdictions, the doctrine essentially holds that a juvenile who was previously 
transferred to adult court via any transfer mechanism will be transferred to adult 
court for subsequent offenses, regardless of whether he or she would have been 
transferred based upon commission of the current offense alone.60 Currently, thirty-
four states have enacted some type of “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine, 
making it the second most widely enacted of the available transfer mechanisms.61  
 The widespread use of the doctrine, as well as the concept of juvenile 
transfers in general, are largely a result of public perception of juvenile crime and 
subsequent responses.62 The media’s focus on severe and violent crimes committed 
by youth has resulted in a tough-on-juvenile-criminals sentiment in the general 
public.63 Although the juvenile crime rate has decreased in recent years, polls reveal 
that the public feels that it is actually increasing.64 As a result, political players 
and policy makers have adopted “tough-on-crime” policies—including support for 
juvenile transfers—in an effort to gain the support of constituents who are fearful of 
young criminals.65 Additionally, courts have refused to hold that juveniles possess 
constitutional or fundamental rights to have their cases handled by juvenile, rather 
than adult, courts.66 Therefore, state legislatures may transfer youth to adult court 
via the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine without infringing upon inherent 
rights of juveniles.67 
59.     See supra text accompanying notes 44−46, 48−53.
60.     See PatrIck GrIffIn, PatrIcIa torBet & LInda szyManskI, nat’L ctr. for JuvenILe Jus-
tIce, tryInG JuvenILes as aduLts In crIMInaL court: an anaLysIs of state transfer ProvI-
sIons (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172836.pdf.
61.     PatrIck GrIffIn, sean addIe, BenJaMIn adaMs & kathy fIrestIne, offIce of Juve-
nILe JustIce & deLInquency PreventIon, tryInG JuvenILes as aduLts: an anaLysIs of state 
transfer LaWs and rePortInG 3 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf.
62.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 156−57.
63.     Id.
64.     Id. at 157.
65.     Id. at 156−57.
66.     See, e.g., Linda A. Szymanski, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Once a Juvenile is 
Transferred to Criminal Court Must They Be Tried As Adults for All Future Offenses?, ncJJ 
snaPshot, June 2010, at 1, http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/Snapshots/2010/vol15_no6_onceanadult.
pdf.
67.     Id.
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One positive aspect of the widespread enactment of the “once an adult, always 
an adult” doctrine concerns the protection of non-transferred youth housed in the 
juvenile justice system from the influence of those juveniles who have been housed 
in adult jails. As a result of previous transfers, some youth may have been housed 
with violent adult criminals for significant periods of time.68 Studies have shown that 
juveniles who are housed with adult inmates often attempt to gain acceptance by 
cultivating identities that embrace violence.69 By treating all previously transferred 
youth as adults for subsequent charges, the doctrine effectively prevents juveniles 
who have been incarcerated with adult criminals from bringing criminal habits and 
values they “learned” to juvenile detention centers.70 
Another benefit of the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine is that it allows 
juveniles to gain more due process rights.71 Although multiple U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions have awarded juveniles many traditional due process rights,72 youth in the 
juvenile court system still do not possess every right that adults do.73 For example, in 
some jurisdictions transcripts are not promulgated during juvenile proceedings, and 
juveniles generally have no right to bail or to a trial by jury.74 Once transferred to adult 
court for a crime that may carry a sentence of six months of incarceration or more, 
juveniles gain the right to a trial by jury, rather than being subjected to the discretion 
of a presiding judge.75 By automatically transferring juveniles who have appeared in 
adult court in the past, the doctrine equips these individuals with more due process 
rights than they would be entitled to in the juvenile court system.   
 
Iv. neGatIve raMIfIcatIons of the “once an aduLt, aLWays an aduLt” 
doctrIne
 The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine has been criticized on many 
grounds.76 The doctrine requires an automatic transfer to adult court without 
consideration of mitigating factors.77 While judicial or prosecutorial waivers allow 
judges or prosecutors to consider factors (such as age, psychological development, 
68.     See neeLuM arya, caMPaIGn for youth JustIce, JaILInG JuvenILes: the danGers of 
IncarceratInG youth In aduLt JaILs In aMerIca (2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.
org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing_Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf. 
“[A]n average of 7,500 youth are incarcerated in adult jails each day in America.” Id. at 16.
69.     E.g., id. at 8.
70.     See Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 87.
71.     Cf. id. at 166 (“Another major criticism of these [juvenile] courts is that juveniles do 
not enjoy the full range of constitutional rights that apply in criminal courts.”).
72.     Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
73.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 166.
74.     Id. at 166, 169.
75.     Id. at 169.
76.     See, e.g., Szymanski, supra note 66.
77.     Id.
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and culpability) when deciding whether a transfer is warranted, the “once an adult, 
always an adult” doctrine is automatic and provides no inquiry into those relevant 
factors.78 Although those considerations may have been assessed previously if a 
juvenile’s first transfer was initiated by a prosecutor or judge, transfer mechanisms 
such as statutory exclusion of certain crimes provide no assessment of mitigating 
factors, so juveniles may have been initially transferred without any consideration 
of culpability or psychological development.79 Additionally, one technical aspect 
of the doctrine indicates cause for alarm: Although most jurisdictions require that a 
previous transfer result in conviction for the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine 
to apply, this is not always the case.80 In two states—California and Delaware—if a 
juvenile was assigned to adult court previously, even absent a conviction, he or she is 
automatically transferred to an adult court for all subsequent crimes.81 In these states, 
juveniles who have been found not guilty in the eyes of the law are still automatically 
transferred to adult courts for subsequent charges. 
 The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine undermines the concept 
of rehabilitation, one of the foundational precepts of the juvenile justice court 
system.82 Automatic transfers fail to account for the fact that a juvenile may have 
been rehabilitated since commission of the initial crime, either as a result of court-
ordered sanctions or actions of his or her own,83 and is now being charged with a less-
serious or nonviolent crime. Studies have shown that juveniles, more so than adults, 
are developmentally amenable to rehabilitation.84 Even when juveniles commit the 
same crimes as adults, studies have revealed that juveniles are amenable to reform 
and are likely to discontinue committing crimes as their brains mature.85 Most 
juvenile offenders will become productive citizens, rather than career offenders, if 
the negative ramifications of adult sanctions do not drastically limit their chances 
for success, such as job and school opportunities.86 Juveniles tried in adult court are 
more likely to commit another crime than comparable juveniles tried in juvenile 
courts.87 The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine, as well as the concept of 
transfers in general, are at odds with these findings regarding the ability of juveniles 
to be rehabilitated if allowed to participate in juvenile, rather than adult court.
78.     See Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 8−10.
79.     See id. at 9.
80.     GrIffIn et aL., supra note 61, at 10−11.
81.     Id.
82.     Alan J. Tomkins, Andrew J. Slain, Marianne N. Hallinan & Cynthia E. Willis, Subtle 
Discrimination in Juvenile Justice Decisionmaking: Social Scientific Perspectives and Expla-
nations, 29 creIGhton L. rev. 1619, 1622 (1996) (“The fundamental goal of the new juvenile 
system was to aid juveniles through rehabilitation, rather than punishment.”).
83.     See Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 10.
84.     See, e.g., Ellis Cose, Rehabilitation Beats Punishments for Juveniles, neWsWeek (Mar. 
13, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/rehabilitation-beats-punishment-juveniles-71201.
85.     See Maroney, supra note 53, at 113−15.
86.     See Clarke, supra note 5, at 718.
87.     Id.
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 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court, in prohibiting the imposition of 
harsh sentences on juvenile offenders, has considered the ability of young men and 
women to be rehabilitated. In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that imposition of 
a life sentence without possibility of parole on a juvenile who committed a crime 
other than homicide was unconstitutional.88 The Court cited rehabilitation as a key 
goal of the juvenile justice system and stated that an imposition of life without 
parole was at odds with the fact that juvenile offenders “are most in need of and 
receptive to rehabilitation.”89 By automatically exposing repeat juvenile offenders 
to adult sanctions rather than rehabilitative juvenile justice solutions, the “once an 
adult, always an adult” doctrine is at odds with the U.S. Supreme Court’s findings 
regarding the unique amenability of juveniles to rehabilitative efforts.
Juveniles charged with nonviolent or minor crimes, such as drug or property 
offenses, experience especially egregious ramifications of the “once an adult, always 
an adult” doctrine.90 Although support for transfers is largely predicated on sending 
violent career offenders to adult court, in reality more than half of transfers affect 
juveniles who have committed nonviolent property, drug, or public order offenses.91 
The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine works to transfer juveniles who have 
committed minor offenses back to adult court for a second time—opening the door 
to the possibility of more severe sanctions, incarceration for a longer period of time, 
and an additional mark on his or her criminal record.
 Although federal law prohibits juveniles from being held in adult 
jails, juveniles transferred to adult courts are exempt from this prohibition.92 
Implications of incarcerating youth with adult criminals must be assessed. Youth 
incarcerated with adult offenders face great obstacles: they are at a far greater risk 
of both physical and sexual assault at the hands of other inmates than their adult 
counterparts.93 Although some jails attempt to alleviate this problem by separating 
juvenile and adult inmates, this practice often results in juveniles being placed in 
isolation.94 This sequestered placement can result in anxiety and exacerbation of 
existing mental disorders.95 Therefore, either option—housing juveniles with adult 
88.     560 U.S. 48 (2010).
89.     Id. at 73−74.
90.     See Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 59−60.
91.     Id. (explaining that during a twenty-four year data period, 60.5% of transferred juve-
niles were involved in nonviolent offenses). Most of these nonviolent offenses were property 
crimes, followed by drug offenses and then public order offenses. Id. Some of this disparity 
may be explained by the use of statutory exclusion laws. Id.
92.     arya, supra note 68, at 22.
93.     Id. at 4 (“[A]ccording to U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
in 2005 and 2006, 21% and 13% respectively, of the victims of inmate-on-inmate sexual 
violence in jails were youth under the age of 18—a surprisingly high percentage of victims 
considering that only 1% of all jail inmates are juveniles.”).
94.     Id.
95.     Id.
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inmates or isolating juveniles—increases the risk of physical or mental harm to 
young inmates. 
 Another unique circumstance that juveniles in adult jails face is that they 
are at a greater risk of committing suicide.96 Juveniles incarcerated in adult jails 
are thirty-six times more likely to commit suicide than juveniles who are housed 
in juvenile detention facilities.97 According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics study, 
juvenile inmates have the highest suicide rate among all inmates.98 Not only are 
long-term juvenile inmates at an increased risk for suicidal behavior—the risk is 
elevated for young women and men who have spent just a week or less in adult 
jail.99 Although this prevalence may be partly explained by the fact that youth in 
general are at a very high risk for suicide,100 and that many incarcerated youth 
are predisposed to mental disorders and substance abuse, the lack of appropriate 
treatment in jails is also to blame.101 The lack of effective mental health screenings 
for juveniles in adult jails, as well as the subpar quality of the treatment received, is 
quite alarming.102      
The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine may exacerbate the racially 
disproportionate impact of juvenile transfers in general.103 In his article concerning 
subtle discrimination in juvenile justice decision making, Alan Tomkins points to 
the large amount of discretion in the juvenile justice system as a vehicle that allows 
subtle biases against minorities to seep in.104 Although it is no longer socially 
acceptable for judges or prosecutors to expressly discriminate against minorities, 
the concept of “aversive racism” may explain why minorities are overrepresented 
in many stages of the juvenile justice system, including transfers to adult courts.105 
96.     Id. at 10−11.
97.     Id. at 11.
98.     chrIstoPher J. MuMoLa, Bureau of JustIce stats., u.s. deP’t of JustIce, suIcIde and 
hoMIcIde In state PrIsons and LocaL JaILs 5 (2005).
99.     arya, supra note 68, at 10.
100.     LIndsay M. hayes, nat’L ctr. on Inst. & aLts., offIce of JuvenILe JustIce & deLIn-
quency PreventIon, JuvenILe suIcIde In confIneMent: a natIonaL study 1 (2009), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/213691.pdf (“More teenagers die from suicide than from 
cancer, heart disease, AIDS, birth defects, stroke, pneumonia and influenza, and chronic lung 
disease combined.”).
101.     arya, supra note 68, at 10–11.
102.     Id. (“According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation in Baltimore, a 
15-year-old inmate was suicidal during his intake screening, was placed in protective custody 
without his medications, did not see a doctor for 25 days, and did not get his medications after 
the doctor’s visit despite his attorney’s attempted intervention.”).
103.     Tomkins et al., supra note 82, at 1631–32, 1640 n.134.
104.     Id. at 1631–36.
105.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 5 (“One issue that is of increasing significance to 
juvenile justice systems is disproportionate minority contact (DMC). DMC refers to the fact 
that youth of color represent less than one-third of the national population but are overrepre-
sented in all aspects of juvenile justice.”).
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Aversive racism is at play when decision makers latch on to non-biased justifications 
for behaviors that may actually be motivated by racial bias.106 Because of the wide 
latitude of discretion afforded to judges and prosecutors when deciding whether to 
transfer juveniles, decisions based on racial stereotypes of criminality can easily 
be explained away by pointing to other characteristics that are more socially 
acceptable, such as lack of school attendance or association with delinquent peers.107 
The automatic transfer mechanism thus exacerbates the problem by exposing those 
juveniles who were first transferred because of aversive racism to adult courts for 
a second time.
 The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine does more harm than good 
because it is incompatible with the biological and social realities of youth, and it 
negatively impacts the lives of many young men and women. Because of juveniles’ 
biological risk-taking propensity, many young lawbreakers will stop offending as 
they become more emotionally mature and are able to assess risk more rationally.108 
The automatic transfer presumption does not take this social science understanding 
into account. Among other negative ramifications, the “once an adult, always an 
adult” doctrine results in unduly harsh punishment for nonviolent juvenile offenders, 
and exposes young men and women to the possibility of incarceration in adult 
jail, where they are at a heightened risk for abuse and suicide.109 Although there 
are some positive aspects of transfers,110 the wide array of negative ramifications 
accompanying the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine clearly outweigh any 
utilitarian value of the doctrine.
  
v. PotentIaL reforM ProPosaLs
 Given the widespread enactment of the “once an adult, always an adult” 
doctrine and the vast array of negative consequences that result, reforms are sorely 
needed. One reform proposal pertains to abolishing or limiting the practice of 
transfers to adult court in general. If this proposal were to be adopted, juveniles would 
almost always be prosecuted in a separate juvenile court system, absent extremely 
egregious circumstances. Although transfers to adult court may serve retributive 
purposes, they are generally counterproductive because they do not help decrease 
the juvenile recidivism rate or foster rehabilitation.111 Transfers do not adequately 
prevent recidivism for a number of reasons, including the criminal habits juveniles 
pick up in adult jails and the negative effect of criminal records on juveniles’ life 
106.     See Tomkins et al., supra note 82, at 1637.
107.     See id. at 1642–44.
108.     See Clarke, supra note 5, at 714.
109.     See supra text accompanying notes 92–102.
110.     See supra text accompanying notes 68–75.
111.     Clarke, supra note 5, at 680–81 (“[T]ransfer is more likely to aggravate recidivism 
than to diminish it.”).
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opportunities.112 Although the juvenile justice system was founded upon the concept 
of rehabilitation, many young men and women in adult jails learn criminal behaviors 
from other inmates and proceed to become chronic criminal offenders.113 Mays and 
Ruddell point to studies that show juvenile transfers to adult court actually result in 
lower rates of community success.114 Additionally, the threat of transfers has not been 
proven to decrease the occurrence of target juvenile offenses, and thus does not have 
an adequate deterrent effect.115
Instead of transfers, rehabilitative juvenile justice solutions, such as probation 
and accompanying conditions,116 may actually more adequately address the problem 
of juvenile crime, as well as result in less negative effects for juvenile offenders.117 
In addition to being more cost-effective than adult sanctions, studies have shown 
that rehabilitative efforts such as community service programs actually better prevent 
juvenile recidivism than incarceration or severe punitive punishments.118 Transferred 
youth are actually thirty-four percent more likely to be re-arrested than children who 
are punished in the juvenile justice system.119 The “caring” and “forgiving” aspects of 
rehabilitative efforts may help foster positive attitudes in juvenile offenders and thus 
reduce the likelihood of reoffending.120 Structured rehabilitative programs that call 
for frequent contact have proven to be the most effective mechanism for reducing 
juvenile recidivism.121 For example, long-term therapeutic programs with frequent 
staff-juvenile interaction seem to be much more effective than short-term or sporadic 
programs such as individual or group counseling.122 Although scholars and advocates 
have long known that rehabilitative interventions better address the problem of 
juvenile crime, convincing the public and policy makers that the “tough on juvenile 
crime” stance is not effective has proven to be a challenge.123
112.     Id.
113.     arya, supra note 68, at 7–8.
114.     See Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 179.
115.     See Bishop, supra note 31, at 85.
116.     Many juveniles receive probation as punishment. These dispositions generally require 
some form of supervision and are often accompanied by requirements such as completing 
community service, living in a group home, or receiving counseling treatment for substance 
abuse or other problems. Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 43−44.
117.     See supra text accompanying notes 90–102.
118.     See Bishop, supra note 31, at 150; Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 179. 
119.     neeLuM arya, caMPaIGn for youth JustIce, state trends: LeGIsLatIve vIctorIes froM 
2005 to 2010 reMovInG youth froM the aduLt crIMInaL JustIce systeM 17 (2010), http://
www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf.
120.     Bishop, supra note 31, at 150 (“Processing in juvenile court is associated with a lower 
probability of reoffending. One reason this may be so is that juvenile justice officials com-
municate messages of caring—that is, offers of attachment—to young people whose back-
grounds are often replete with alienation from and rejection by conventional adults.”).
121.     Id. at 150–52.
122.     Id. at 151–52.
123.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 179.
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Because the practice of transferring juveniles to adult courts certainly 
serves some legitimate retributive purposes, limiting the reach of transfers is a more 
suitable reform proposal than abolishing the doctrine altogether. Statutory exclusion 
laws ensure that all juveniles charged with certain violent and serious crimes are 
transferred.124 Blended sentencing laws provide that adult sanctions will be imposed 
only if certain terms imposed by the juvenile court, such as completing community 
service or therapy programs, are not met.125 Because these two mechanisms leave 
little room for prosecutorial or judicial bias, jurisdictions could begin to rely solely 
on these two forms of transfer. Limiting transfers in this way would ensure that only 
violent or noncompliant juveniles were subject to adult penalties, and would protect 
juveniles who have committed minor and nonviolent crimes against prosecutorial 
or judicial bias. However, states may need to reform their statutory exclusion 
schemes, as some nonviolent crimes, such as drug or property offenses, are often 
included in the enumerated crimes.126
Another reform proposal involves complete abolition of the “once an adult, 
always an adult” doctrine. Although support for the doctrine stems from society’s 
desire to adequately punish juvenile criminals and keep individuals safe, abolition 
of the doctrine does not mean that these ends could not be met or that violent 
criminals would not be punished or removed from society. Juveniles charged with 
serious or violent crimes could still be transferred via one of the other mechanisms, 
and thus could be prosecuted in adult court and subjected to severe or long-lasting 
adult sanctions when appropriate. If the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine 
was abolished, juveniles who had been transferred in the past would no longer be 
automatically presumed fit to appear in adult court. Rather, the situation surrounding 
his or her current offense and level of culpability would be analyzed in order to make a 
more accurate transfer decision using one of the other available transfer mechanisms. 
 Because the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine is so widely 
enacted and entrenched,127 complete abolition of the doctrine in the near future 
seems unlikely. However, limiting the reach and severity of the doctrine may be a 
useful way to reduce negative ramifications and ensure that the automatic transfer 
applies only to juveniles who commit severe and violent offenses. Some states 
have already imposed such restrictions.128 In Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Texas, only subsequent felonies committed by previously transferred juveniles 
are automatically filed in adult court.129 Additionally, a few states only apply the 
doctrine to juveniles who were at least sixteen years of age when the subsequent 
124.     See supra text accompanying notes 36–37.
125.     See supra text accompanying note 37.
126.     Clarke, supra note 5, at 678.
127.     See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
128.     GrIffIn et aL., supra note 61, at 7.
129.     Id.
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offense was committed.130 These limitations ensure that minor and nonviolent 
charges do not result in automatic transfer, and that only juveniles who have almost 
reached the age of legal adulthood are subject to automatic transfer to adult courts.
Indiana has taken steps in recent years to minimize the negative effects of 
the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine.131 The state’s prior code stated that 
the doctrine applied to any juvenile previously transferred, no matter whether the 
transfer was for a felony or a misdemeanor.132 In 2008, House Bill 1122 limited the 
reach of the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine to juveniles who were initially 
transferred for a felony and later charged with another felony.133 Additionally, the 
Indiana bill limited the list of crimes for which prosecutors could directly file 
juvenile cases in adult court, and for which judges have case-by-case discretion.134 
Reform measures such as Indiana’s House Bill 1122 help protect juveniles and 
reduce the recidivism rate,135 while still allowing for transfer to adult court for those 
juveniles charged with violent or serious crimes.
 
concLusIon
             The “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine has been enacted by many 
states, likely as a result of “tough on crime” movements and widespread fear of 
juvenile crime driven by media sensationalism.136 Although the doctrine provides 
for automatic transfer of some violent offenders who have committed severe 
crimes, it is overbroad and it is not the best way to reduce juvenile recidivism. The 
automatic transfer mechanism fails to take into account the severity of the crime 
with which the juvenile is currently charged, as well as his or her culpability, and 
instead bases the transfer on a past act. The Federal Rules of Evidence generally 
prohibit jury members from hearing information about a putative criminal’s past 
convictions and offenses in adult court;137 why then should prior convictions play 
such a significant role in juvenile proceedings? Many “once an adult, always an 
adult” transfers affect juveniles charged with nonviolent crimes, such as drug or 
property offenses.138 Both social science research and U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
support the concept that juveniles are psychologically amenable to rehabilitation 
130.     Id. (explaining that Iowa, California, and Oregon all require juveniles to be sixteen 
years or older for the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine to be applicable).
131.     Mays & ruddeLL, supra note 1, at 87.
132.     See arya, supra note 119, at 36.
133.     Id. (citing B. 1122, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008)).
134.     Id.
135.     Because juvenile justice solutions result in fewer arrests than sending children to adult 
court, measures such as Indiana’s House Bill 1122 help lower recidivism rates. See supra text 
accompanying notes 118–19.
136.     See supra text accompanying notes 62–66.
137.     fed. r. evId. 404(b).
138.     See supra text accompanying notes 90–91.
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and usually stop offending as they mature emotionally and become adults.139 
Studies have shown that juvenile rehabilitative efforts better reduce recidivism than 
adult sanctions.140 Rather than attempting to rehabilitate juveniles, the “once an 
adult, always an adult” doctrine exposes juveniles to adult jails once again, where 
they often learn criminal behaviors and are saddled with marks on their permanent 
record that will constrain future life opportunities.141 Juveniles incarcerated with 
adults are disproportionately victimized and are at a higher risk for suicide.142 The 
doctrine may also exacerbate the problem of “aversive racism” because of the 
highly discretionary nature of some transfer mechanisms.143
 Although elimination of transfers or the “once an adult, always an adult” 
doctrine seem unlikely, reforms could minimize negative impacts, while still 
ensuring that violent career offenders are duly punished. Regarding the practice 
of transfers in general, reliance on statutory exclusion laws would reduce much 
inherent discretion and ensure that only juveniles charged with certain violent or 
serious crimes are transferred, as long as the enumerated list of transferrable crimes 
is reasonable. An even better reform is to employ blended sentencing models, 
which impose adult sanctions only if and when a juvenile does not complete the 
terms of his or her juvenile punishment. Even if a jurisdiction were to rely solely on 
these two transfer mechanisms, limitations to the “once an adult, always an adult” 
doctrine are still needed. If the doctrine was limited to apply only to juveniles 
charged with subsequent felonies, nonviolent offenders who committed minor 
crimes would be protected from automatic transfer. Another reform involves setting 
an age limit, so that only juveniles who are almost legal adults are automatically 
subject to adult courts and sanctions. These reforms would enable more juveniles to 
receive rehabilitative sanctions, which have been shown to better reduce recidivism 
than punitive adult sanctions.144
 There is hope for reform. More than five states have adopted at least one 
of the reform proposals outlined above limiting the doctrine of “once an adult, 
always an adult.”145 Perhaps the efforts of these states, combined with greater public 
awareness of the negative effects of the “once an adult, always an adult” doctrine 
and the unique amenability of juveniles to rehabilitation, could result in a greater 
widespread movement to limit the reach of the doctrine.
139.     See supra text accompanying notes 82–89.
140.     See supra text accompanying note 108.
141.     See supra text accompanying notes 111–14.
142.     See supra text accompanying notes 96–102.
143.     See supra text accompanying notes 103–07.
144.     See supra text accompanying notes 116–23.
145.     See supra text accompanying notes 128–35.
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